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Causation in International Protection from Armed Conflict 
 
Hélène Lambert1 
 
 
In 2011, Afghanistan became again the main country of origin of asylum seekers in 
industrialized countries, followed not far behind by Iraq and Serbia (and Kosovo).2 
Industrialized countries also received record high numbers of asylum seekers 
originating from the Ivory Coast, Libya, Syria and Tunisia. 3  Other significant 
countries of origin of asylum seekers in industrialized countries were Somalia, 
Eritrea, Nigeria and Mexico.4 It is no coincidence that all of these countries have 
experienced, and in some cases continue to experience, armed conflict. How we 
understand violence in a situation of armed conflict, and its effect on civilians, is 
therefore fundamental to decision makers and the courts in receiving countries.  
 
This chapter builds on the seminal work of James Hathaway and Michelle Foster on 
causation in the context of refugee protection under the 1951 Convention relating to 
the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the Refugee Convention).5 Whereas the focus of 
Hathaway and Foster’s work has been on refugee protection under the Refugee 
Convention, particularly the nexus between ‘being persecuted’ and the five grounds 
listed in Article 1(A)2, this chapter expands the scope of enquiry to other forms of 
international protection of pertinence to victims of armed conflict (such as subsidiary 
protection), with an empirical focus on the practice of the UK courts.6   
 
The EU Qualification Directive (QD) defines ‘persons eligible to subsidiary 
protection’ as non-EU nationals ‘in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of 
origin … would face a real risk of suffering serious harm’.7 It further defines serious 
harm as ‘serious and individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The author is grateful to Theo Farrell, War Studies, KCL, for his feedback on this chapter. 
2  UNHCR, ‘Asylum Levels and Trends in Industrialized Countries, 2011’ (2012) 
<http://www.unhcr.org/4e9beaa19.html> accessed 3 September 2013, 15-16. China also was a major 
source of asylum seekers. 
3 Ibid, 18. 
4 Ibid, 18. 5	  J. Hathaway and M. Foster, ‘The Causal Connection (“Nexus”) to a Convention Ground’, Discussion 
Paper No.3 (Advanced Refugee Law Workshop IARLJ, Auckland, New Zealand, October 2002), 
reprinted in (2003) 15 IJRL 461; and M. Foster, ‘Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause 
in the Refugee Convention’ (2002) 23  Mich J Int’l L 265.	  
6 Note that between 2007 and 2011, the UK was consistently ranked between 4th and 7th amongst the 
top 15 receiving industrialized countries, with asylum seekers primarily coming from Afghanistan, 
Pakistan and Iran, as well as Sri Lanka, Nigeria, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan. UNHCR, ‘Asylum 
Levels’ (n 2) 12, 43 and 45. 
7 Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011 on 
standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of 
international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary 
protection, and for the content of the protection granted (recast) [2011] OJEU 20.12.2011 L337/9-23, 
Article 2(f). 
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indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict’.8 At 
the heart of Article 15c therefore is a causal claim, namely, the existence of a serious 
and individual threat to life or person created by the presence of an armed conflict.  
The obvious approach to determining an individual claim under Article 15c would be 
to establish (a) that an armed conflict is present, (b) that an individual threat to life or 
person exists, and (c) that the former was a cause of the latter. This formulation 
follows standard practice in social science, which conceptualizes causation in terms of 
a traceable relationship between observable variables – the causal (or independent) 
and outcome (or dependent) variables. 
 
The problem with this dominant approach is that it encourages a false sense of 
certainty when it comes to explaining the social world. It also privileges the search for 
objective knowledge, to ‘prove’ the existence of relationships between observable 
variables, over the accumulation of subjective knowledge that reveals the meaning of 
situations. The ‘richness vs. rigour’ debate over the virtues of qualitative versus 
quantitative analysis is an old one. For our purposes, it is sufficient to ask: what 
‘intellectual shortcuts’ are the courts taking in applying conventional causal analysis 
in asylum determination cases? The dominant approach in social science requires that 
observable variables – armed conflict and existence of genuine threat – be ‘fixed’ 
conceptually, so that emphasis may be put on exploring the existence or not of a 
causal relationship between the two.  As a consequence of this, less effort may be put 
into understanding violence as experienced by people on the ground and, in 
understanding the existence of ‘a serious and individual threat’ as perceived by people 
on the ground. For example, two key ‘objective’ criteria under International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) in determining the existence of an armed conflict are the 
general level of violence and the degree of organization on the part of armed actors.9 
But these are not necessarily the most important factors in determining the severity of 
a situation of armed conflict for civilians that experience it.  
 
Recent scholarship on Non-International Armed Conflicts (NIAC) suggests that much 
of the armed violence is private and not political in character; the political economy 
of such conflicts is primarily concerned with the personal acquisition of wealth and 
power, and is largely fuelled by micro-dynamics of inter-personal grievance and 
score-settling.10 Thus, a NIAC may exhibit quite a low level of lethal violence and 
limited degree of organization by armed actors, and yet civilians on the ground may 
perceive serious threats as a consequence of daily and routine experiences. 
 
This chapter advocates a broader approach to causation in asylum cases. In place of 
the social science approach that focuses on tracing ‘efficient causation’ between 
observable variables, it advocates an approach that gives equal priority to 
‘constitutive causation’, that is, to understanding how threats are ‘constituted’ within 
a social environment. This broader approach discourages the early definitional fixing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Article 15(c), Qualification Directive. Serious harm is further defined as (a) the death penalty or 
execution; or (b) torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin. 
9 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflict’, report 
(31st International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, Geneva, 28 Nov- 1 Dec 2011) 7. 
10 S. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge University Press 2006) and E. Simpson, 
War From the Ground Up (Hurst 2012). I am grateful to Theo Farrell for pointing me towards the work 
by Simpson and Kalyvas. 
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of ‘conflict and threat’ - or ‘cause and effect’. Instead it opens up enquiry into the 
complex character of contemporary NIACs (or material conditions), and the 
experience and perceptions of asylum applicants fleeing armed conflict (or the social 
context). I conclude with some comments on the role of IHL in understanding 
causation. 
 
By way of illustration, let us briefly consider two cases by two very different judicial 
bodies: Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom decided by the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) on 28 June 2011, and AMM and others (Somalia) v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department decided by the UK Upper Tribunal (UKUT) on 28 
November 2011. Both cases involved Somali nationals about to be sent back from the 
UK to parts of Somalia, and considerations of degrading or inhuman treatment in the 
context of the humanitarian situation existing in southern and central Somalia, outside 
Mogadishu. Thus, even though these cases involved the interpretation of Article 3 
ECHR/Article 15(b) QD, they do provide us with a picture of the courts’ approach to 
causation between an armed conflict and the real risk of ill-treatment/harm to civilians 
which would also apply to Article 15(c) cases. 
 
In Sufi and Elmi v United Kingdom, the ECtHR, having first established that 
Mogadishu was generally unsafe, considered whether the applicants could be returned 
safely to another part of Somalia, and it found the living conditions in the main 
refugee camps in Somalia and neighbouring Kenya to be so dire that for the UK to 
return a person to these camps would breach Article 3 ECHR.11 In order to reach its 
decision, the Strasbourg Court drew a distinction between: 
 
-­‐ Dire humanitarian situations, which are attributable to poverty or to a lack of 
resources to deal with naturally phenomena such as drought; and 
 
-­‐ A humanitarian crisis that is mainly due to ‘the direct and indirect actions of 
the parties to the conflict’.12  For the Court, ‘it is clear that while drought has 
contributed to the humanitarian crisis, that crisis is predominantly due to the 
direct and indirect actions of the parties to the conflict’ (italics added).13 
 
The Court explained this finding based on the fact that ‘The reports indicate that all 
parties to the conflict have employed indiscriminate methods of warfare in densely 
populated urban areas and with no regard to the safety of civilian population’; this 
‘has resulted in widespread displacement and the breakdown of social, political and 
economic infrastructures’.14 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 This is in stark contrast with its decision in Salah Sheekh v the Netherlands [2007] 45 EHRR 50 
where the Court considered that ‘socio-economic and humanitarian considerations … do not 
necessarily have a bearing, and certainly not a decisive one, on the question … [of] real risk’, in the 
context of ‘internal flight alternative’ (para 141). 
12 Sufi and Elmi v UK [2011] ECHR 1045, para 282. Note that the Strasbourg Court also recognized 
‘real risk’ of ill-treatment on account of the human rights situation, as distinguished from the situation 
of general violence, in the context of internal relocation to parts of southern and central Somalia (ibid, 
para 272). 
13Ibid, para 282. 
14 Ibid, para 282. This situation was further ‘greatly exacerbated by al-Shabaab’s refusal to permit 
international aid agencies to operate in the areas under its control’. 
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The UKUT expressed a real concern with this finding on the ground that ‘even on the 
evidence available to the Court in that case, it is, with respect, difficult to see how the 
actions of the “parties to the conflict” (which must mean the TFG/AMISOM and Al-
Shabaab) can be said, by their indiscriminate methods of warfare over a 
comparatively short period of time, to have caused a breakdown of “social, political 
and economic infrastructures”’ (italics added).15  
 
These two cases illustrate two different approaches to armed conflict and causation. 
As will be discussed below, the UKUT in AMM applied the ‘efficient causation’ 
approach in assessing the existence of a direct line of causation between armed 
violence and civilian flight. In addition, the UKUT in AMM seemed to be requiring 
some kind of pattern or regularity that would enable it to reach a probable solution. In 
Sufi and Elmi, we may say that the ECtHR applied a ‘constitutive causation’ approach 
in recognizing that the armed conflict created conditions that produced threats of 
serious harm to civilians from the collapse of basic services and infrastructure, albeit 
with a confusing reference to the ‘predominant cause’ approach. 
 
1. The ‘causation problem’ in refugee law and subsidiary protection law 
 
There is an emerging body of writing that is related to causation in refugee protection, 
however, as yet no study has explored or understood causation in the context of 
subsidiary protection. The sections below aim to fill this gap. 
 
1.1 What do we understand by causation in refugee law (Article 1A(2))? 
 
James Hathaway and Michelle Foster have long highlighted the importance of a clear 
understanding of nexus in refugee law, namely of establishing ‘a causal connection 
between a Convention ground and the reason for the applicant’s well-founded fear of 
being persecuted’.16 Taking the example of two cases based on very similar facts and 
raising almost identical issues, they show how two different approaches to nexus 
could lead to two totally different outcomes. According to one approach, entirely 
based on the existence of a direct cause, in this case persecution based on religion, the 
Court would ask the question: why does the persecutor wish to harm the applicant, or 
the state refrain from protecting him? 17  With such an approach, the intent to 
discriminate on religious grounds is determinative because it is believed that 
‘conscious discrimination’ is essential to the concept of persecution under the 
Refugee Convention.18 According to the other approach, based on how religion might 
instead indirectly have caused the applicant to fear persecution, the Court would ask 
the question: ‘why is the applicant in the predicament in which he is?’19 With such an 
approach, the Court is essentially trying to identify the ‘true reason’ for the feared 
persecution on the ground that ‘history supports the view that religious persecution 
often takes “indirect” forms’.20 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 In AMM and others (conflict; humanitarian crisis; returnees; FGM) Somalia v. Secretary of State for 
the Home Department, CG [2011] UKUT 00445 (IAC) para 131. Note that the judgment in Sufi and 
Elmi v UK was handed down while the AMM cases were pending, but that the ECtHR was not final at 
the time and the Secretary of State still hoped to influence the final judgment. 
16 Hathaway and  Foster, ‘The Causal Connection’ (n 5) 465. 
17 Ibid, 466. 
18 Omoruyi v SSHD [2000] EWCA Civ 258. 
19 Hathaway and Foster, ‘The Causal Connection’ (n 5) 466. 
20 Okere v MIMA [1998] 157 ALR 678. 
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It is fair to say that agreement generally exists that the Refugee Convention does not 
require a Convention ground to be the sole reason for being persecuted. However, in 
practice, courts 
 
frequently apply an effective sole cause test by rejecting Convention-related 
explanations for persecution (despite evidence to the contrary) and 
hypothesizing about alternative non-Convention grounds that can exclusively 
account for the fear of persecution.21  
 
Foster explains: 
 
[C]ourts frequently proceed on the apparent assumption that there is one sole 
explanation or reason for a well-founded fear of being persecuted, and therefore 
the existence of a non-Convention ground as a potential explanation for the fear 
of being persecuted negates a Convention-related explanation. Such an 
approach involves an artificial analysis whereby a false dichotomy is drawn 
between non-Convention grounds and Convention-related explanations or 
factors.22  
 
Beyond the ‘effective sole cause’ test, uncertainty remains as to whether a Convention 
ground should be an essential cause, the predominant (or central) cause, or simply a 
contributing cause.  
 
The ‘essential and significant cause’ test or ‘but for’ test23 has been criticized for 
involving too many different interpretations and therefore for being imprecise. 
Indeed, if the ‘but for’ test does succeed in remedying some of the limitations of the 
‘sole cause’ test by contemplating multiple causes,24 ‘it has been heavily denounced 
… due to its inability adequately to accommodate situations involving multiple 
causes, including both multiple independent causes and multiple cumulative causes’25 
because to do so, as Lord Justice Sedley notes, ‘opens up the possibility of an infinity 
of causes’.26 
 
Foster further argues that ‘[e]ven in cases where courts are able to determine the 
multiple causes, gaps in the available evidence are often so significant as to seriously 
impede the nexus determination’. 27  The gathering of evidence in refugee law, 
particularly in civil war situations, can be obstructed by a number of considerations, 
such as ‘[d]ifficulties in cross-cultural communication, lack of access to corroborating 
evidence in foreign countries, inability to procure witnesses’ etc.28 Thus, multiple 
causes and evidentiary gaps - so characteristic of refugee law - pose serious 
challenges to successful nexus determination.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Foster, ‘Causation in Context’ (n 5) 270. 
22 Ibid. 
23 This test asks the question: ‘but for the protected ground, would the persecution have occurred?’ 
24 Foster, ‘Causation in Context’ (n 5) 274. 
25 Hathaway and Foster, ‘The Causal Connection’ (n 5) 471. 
26 Sedley, L.J. of the Court of Appeal, in Velasco v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
quoted in Foster, ‘Causation in Context’ (n 5) 276. 
27 Foster, ‘Causation in Context’ (n 5) 297. 
28 Ibid. 
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As will be discussed below, recent works by social scientist have studied the 
challenges associated with causal analysis. For example, consideration of multiple 
causes ultimately requires counter-factual analysis. This is where causation gets 
immensely complex.  Lebow explains that ‘to assess the probability of an alternative 
world we must direct our attention, not to any particular alternative world, but to all 
the possible worlds in which a specified outcome did or did not occur’.29 Viewed this 
way, analysis of multiple potential causes actually requires analysis of multiple 
counter-factual worlds, each with its own complex social dynamics. This is Lord 
Justice Sedley’s ‘infinity of causes.’ 
 
The reality is that tests based on essential, predominant and even contributing causes 
have failed to recognize the underlying complexity of causal analysis. Instead, courts 
have chosen to isolate and weigh different causes, without sufficiently recognizing the 
interconnectedness, contingency and social context of these various causes. For 
instance, the ‘predominant cause’ test has been criticized for reducing the evidentiary 
test in the Refugee Convention to mathematical calculations or weighting, 
disconnected from ethical considerations.30 Hence, courts have often preferred to rely 
on the ‘contributing cause’ test according to which the fear of being persecuted only 
requires to be caused ‘at least in part’ by a Convention ground, as long as it is not 
‘remote to the point of irrelevance’.31 
 
In sum, the key literature on causation in refugee law argues for a rejection of the 
‘sole cause’ test for being too restrictive and of the ‘but for’ test for being 
unworkable. Furthermore, the requirement that a Convention ground be ‘central or 
predominant’ should not be read in the Refugee Convention because trying to 
ascertain the degree of significance of a particular factor is simply too artificial. 
According to Foster: 
 
In none of the refugee cases reviewed for the purposes of [her] article, involving 
multiple causes, was a court able to ascertain the degree of significance of a 
certain factor, other than to recognize that it played “a part” in the fear of future 
persecution. Rather, it is acknowledged that in many cases Convention factors 
are “inextricably linked” to non-Convention grounds.32  
 
The key literature, therefore, suggests that the most reliable approach to causation is 
‘one that asks whether the Convention ground is a contributing cause of the 
applicant’s well-founded fear of being persecuted’.33 I argue, that even with this test, 
which has the virtue of considering the wider social context of civilian flight, there 
still is a risk that courts may place too much faith in the possibility of isolating and 
weighing causes as observable variables.  
 
1.2 What do we understand by causation in subsidiary protection law? 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 R.N. Lebow, Forbidden Fruit – Counterfactual and International Relations (Princeton University 
Press 2010) 194. 
30 Hathaway and Foster, ‘The Causal Connection’ (n 5) 474. 
31 Ibid, 476. 
32 Foster, ‘Causation in Context’ (n 5) 336. 
33 Ibid, 340. See also J.C. Hathaway, ‘Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground’ (2002) 
23  Mich J Int’l L 207, para 13, recommending that the test be one of ‘contributing cause’ rather than, 
for example, ‘motivating cause’. 
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Article 15c of the EU Qualification Directive defines serious harm as ‘serious and 
individual threat to a civilian's life or person by reason of [‘en raison de’] 
indiscriminate violence in situations of [‘résultant de’] international or internal armed 
conflict’ (italics added). 
 
In clear contrast with the ‘causation problem’ in refugee law, which is concerned with 
flight from individual persecution (i.e., discriminate violence for specific reasons), the 
‘causation problem’ in EU subsidiary protection law is essentially about flight from 
the indiscriminate effects of generalized violence in an armed conflict. Thus, the 
nature of the threat (i.e., its indiscriminate effects) emanating from generalized 
violence, as opposed to the individualization of the fear emanating from persecution, 
is at the heart of Article 15c. This core element calls for a close examination of 
causation between an objective situation of generalized violence and a need for 
international protection from a harm that is not discriminate (persecution) but 
indiscriminate (generalized violence).34  
 
Considerations of IHL have been ruled out by recent case law from the ECJ/CJEU35 
and the UKCA.36 Because of this, the intentions or culpability of the actors to a 
conflict are not important to an understanding of causation in Article 15c.37 Rather, 
the intensity or level of violence is the crucial element to any such enquiry into the 
causes of the threat and flight.38 Accordingly, up to now, case law has focused on 
assessing the level of violence in an armed conflict and resulting indiscriminate 
effects on the civilian population. However, logically one must also consider the 
character of violence as a quality distinct from the level of violence in order to gain a 
more reliable appreciation of ‘why people flee armed conflicts’.39 In principle, it is 
entirely possible for an armed conflict to display relatively low level of generalized 
violence but of such a character as to expose civilians to real risk of serious harm. 
 
2. Causation and complexity of armed conflict 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 According to Jane McAdam, a reading of Article 2(f) 2011 QD (old Article 2(e) 2004 QD) shows 
that ‘Conditions in the country of origin are a precondition to triggering article 15(c)’ and the cause of 
the threat is ‘indiscriminate violence arising in situation of armed conflict’. J. McAdam, 
Complementary Protection in International Refugee Law (Oxford University Press 2007) 77. The 
original version of Article 15 also provided that the threat could result from ‘systematic or generalized 
violations of [an applicant’s] human rights’, but this additional ground was soon deleted. 
35 See Case C-465/07 Elgafaji v Staatssecretaris van Justitie [2009] ECR I-921, and Case C-285/12, 
Aboubacar Diakite v Commissaire général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides,  30 January 2014. 
36 QD and AH (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 620. 
37 HM and Others v SSHD (HM1) (Article 15c) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC) para 77. 
38 C-465/07 Elgafaji (n 35); C-285/12 Diakite (n 35); QD and AH (Iraq) (n 36); Home Office, UK 
Border Agency, Casework Instruction, ‘Humanitarian protection: Article 15 (c) of the Qualification 
Directive’, 13 September 2010. 
39 H. Lambert and T. Farrell, ‘The Changing Character of Armed Conflict and the Implications for 
Refugee Protection Jurisprudence’ (2010) 22 IJRL 237; T. Farrell and O. Schmitt, ‘The Causes, 
Character and Conduct of Armed Conflict, and the Effects on Civilian Populations, 1990-2010’, 
UNHCR Legal and Protection Policy Research Series, April 2012; H. Lambert, ‘The Next Frontier: 
Expanding Protection in Europe for Victims of Armed Conflict and Violence’ (2013) 25 IJRL 207. See 
also, H. Storey, ‘Armed Conflict in Asylum Law: The “War-Flaw”’ (2012) 31 RSQ 1, and J.F. 
Durieux, ‘Of War, Flows, Laws and Flaws: A Reply to Hugo Storey’ (2012) 31 RSQ 161. 
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According to Gil Loescher: ‘The real refugee problem is that political, economic, and 
security conditions in the home country are so bad that citizens feel compelled to 
leave’.40 How does one disentangle these conditions for the purpose of granting 
protection? And should these be disentangled at all? 
 
Since Descartes, empiricist-positivist theorists have referred to causes as ‘pushing and 
pulling’ forces, ‘those things that through their action or movement precipitate 
change’, namely, the  ’efficient cause’.41 Understood in this way, causes have been 
‘associated with regularities and mechanistic “when A, then B” type relations’.42 This 
approach, which in modern times is most closely associated with David Hume, 
assumes a linear relationship between efficient causes and outcomes. It requires that 
causes and outcomes be conceptually fixed and observable, and attention is then 
focused on examining the relationship between the former and the latter. For example, 
under such an approach, one would isolate level of armed violence, food insecurity, 
and collapse of basic services, as separate potential ‘causes’ of civilian flight, and 
seek to weigh each as actual causes in individual cases. The problem with this 
approach is that the focus is on identifying and weighing observable variables rather 
than understanding the real world around us. Indeed, in our everyday life, the notion 
of cause is used in a much wider sense when we talk about ‘consequences’; we talk 
‘of things, ideas or people as ‘influencing’, ‘producing’, ‘constraining’, ‘enabling’ or 
‘shaping’ courses of event’.43 This more ‘common-sensical’ everyday terminology’ is 
not captured in the Humean conceptualization of efficient causes.44 
 
An alternative approach is to focus on ‘constitutive cause’; this is cause in the sense 
of making it possible for something to happen. According to this view, causes are not 
the relationship between A and B, but rather the materiality and social structures that 
make it possible for A and B to exist and meaningfully relate to one another.45 Such 
an approach would direct more attention to the underlying material conditions that 
produce serious threats to civilians that necessitate flight. Thus, armed violence may 
not directly produce immediate threats of sufficient magnitude, but may nonetheless 
create the material conditions for the collapse of those things that are necessary to 
sustain civilian lives and communities. An example might be the collapse of 
agriculture in an area affected by armed conflict. In such a situation, it may appear 
that the efficient cause of population displacement is food insecurity, but the 
constitutive cause is the armed conflict. 
 
The ‘constitutive causation’ approach also focuses attention on understanding the 
social context of armed violence. How is violence used to create social control? What 
social meanings are attached to violent acts? One example is the use of ‘night-letters’ 
by the Taliban to control civilian communities in contested areas of Afghanistan. 
Robbed of its social context, there is nothing violent about delivering a letter. 
However, for civilians on the ground, the violence of such letters is very real, and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 G. Loescher, Beyond Charity – International Cooperation and the Global Refugee Crisis (Oxford 
University Press 1993) 181. 
41  M. Kurki, Causation in International Relations – Reclaiming Causal Analysis (Cambridge 
University Press 2008) 219.  
42 Ibid, 138, referring to Humean philosophies. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid, 218-230. 
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sufficiently terrifying to ensure compliance or to cause flight. Social context is 
equally important in the case of acts of indiscriminate violence. For example, suicide 
attacks are made possible by social structures that give value to such activity, and 
accordingly produce people prepared to kill themselves and murder innocents.  
 
Issues of social structures, meanings and context are especially important for violence 
which produces low civilian fatalities, and thus may make an armed conflict appear 
less severe to outside observers, but which may be widespread and/or truly terrifying 
to civilians on the ground. Note that, in contrast, IHL directs our attention to concrete 
observables that are divorced of social context, such as, ‘the number, duration and 
intensity of individual confrontations, the type of weapons and other military 
equipment used, the number and calibre of munitions fired, the number of persons and 
types of forces partaking in the fighting, the number of casualties, the extent of 
material destruction, and the number of civilians fleeing combat zones’.46 
 
Recent research has highlighted the importance of understanding how armed conflict 
creates the material conditions that cause civilians to flee. In a comparative study of 
four conflicts that produced mass displacement of civilians – DRC and Chad in 2000, 
and Somalia and Sudan in 2007 – Lambert and Farrell note that the number of civilian 
fatalities in conflict was remarkably low in all but DRC (even using the highest 
estimates). Equally striking is that under-5 mortality and child malnourishment rates 
were very high in all four countries affected by conflict: 11-20% for under-5 
mortality, and 28-36% for child malnourishment.47 In a follow-on study for UNHCR, 
Farrell and Schmitt show the linkages between, on the one hand, armed conflict, 
poverty and food insecurity and, on the other hand, the greatly raised incidence of 
disease. They note the devastating impact of armed conflict on the economies of 
affected countries, observing that ‘the typical NIAC lasts seven years … leaving a 
country 15 per cent poorer at the end’.48 As Farrell and Schmitt explain, this has 
follow-on effects on food insecurity. ‘Analysis of cross-national quantitative data 
reveals that the median armed conflict between 1990 and 2004 will have increased the 
number of undernourished in the general population by 3.3 per cent, or 300,000 
persons’.49 Finally, Farrell and Schmitt discuss how displacement, poverty, and food 
insecurity greatly increase the vulnerability of individuals and communities to 
disease. Crowded displaced persons camps, with cramped conditions, poor sanitation, 
inadequate access to food and healthcare, and undernourished people, are perfect 
breeding grounds for deadly diseases, such as, tuberculosis, cholera, typhoid and 
dysentery. Farrell and Schmitt cite one study in the leading medical journal, the 
Lancet, which found that ‘over 80 per cent of the 300,000 excess deaths from the 
2004-08 Darfur conflict occurred not as a result of armed violence but from diseases 
like diarrhea’.50 
 
Recent research also highlights the importance of understanding the social context of 
armed violence, that is, the social meanings attached to acts of violence and the social 
structures that produce and sustain such violent activity. It is clear that NIACs have a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 ICRC, ‘International Humanitarian Law and the challenges of contemporary armed conflicts’ (n 9). 
47 Lambert and Farrell, ‘The Changing Character of Armed Conflict’ (n 39) 264-5. 
48 Farrell and Schmitt, ‘The Causes, Character and Conduct of Armed Conflict’ (n 39) 11. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid, referring to O. Degomme and D. Guha-Sapir, ‘Patterns of Mortality Rates in the Darfur 
Conflict’ (2010) 373 Lancet 297. 
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reverse political economy from traditional international armed conflicts (IACs). In 
NIACs, armed groups tend to make far more extensive and everyday use of violence 
to control civilian populations with the aim of extracting resources and/or labour to 
sustain military activity, which is itself often directed towards the illegal 
accumulation of private wealth. This character of NIAC is well understood in the 
academic literature and in IHL.51 Less appreciated perhaps is the extent to which 
armed violence is driven by local pressures and opportunities, and depends on the 
presence of social as well as material resources.  
 
In his widely acclaimed study of civil war, Stathis Kalyvas argues that NIACs are not 
fuelled by ideologies or ethnic cleavages at the macro-level. Rather they are fuelled 
by micro-level dynamics, differences between and within communities at a very local 
level, such as feuds and disputes over land and other resources. Armed conflict 
provides opportunities for local actors to access social resources, such as, a 
legitimating ideology and/or higher authority, to make it possible for them to engage 
in armed violent action. 52  For instance, the dominant view of the NIAC in 
Afghanistan is that it is an armed conflict between the Afghan State, supported by 
international forces, and a Taliban insurgency. However, one recent study uncovers 
the extent to which armed violence on the ground is driven by self-interest, rivalry 
between village or valley based sub-tribal groups, and a local level competition for 
resources.53 In this local level struggle, the Afghan State and the Taliban are both 
exploited by local actors as sources of social legitimacy and material support. Sub-
tribal groups that are dominant in local government commonly abuse their position to 
direct security forces against rival sub-tribal groups. Absent social context, the 
conflict becomes one of State versus insurgent. With social context, it becomes clear 
that a more complicated set of local dynamics is at play. To illustrate this point, 
Afghan families commonly send relatives to join both the State security forces and the 
insurgency in order to be able to extend influence into both camps.54 
 
3. How the UK Courts have attempted to deal with causation in Article 15c 
 
Causation has long been an issue of considerable interest for the UK courts and 
tribunals, particularly in tort law. A search on Westlaw UK (03 January 2013) - 
Keyword ‘causation’ – found 4,000 hits, all under Cases, none under Legislation, 
Journals, current awareness or EU.  Of these 4,000 cases, most dealt with criminal 
law matters, very few deal with issues of refugees and armed conflict.  
 
3.1 Reasons and causes 
 
Let us first consider the question: are ‘reasons’ the same as ‘causes’? Some authors 
argue that reasons for social action or human motives or intentions (referring to the 
‘self’) are not causal explanations; causes should only apply to something of an 
external kind.55 In the context of the Refugee Convention, Article 1A(2), when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ibid, 3-6, referring to the work by Mary Kaldor (New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global 
Era (2nd edn, Polity 2006)) and Paul Collier (The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are 
Failing and What Can Be Done About It (Oxford University Press 2008)) amongst others. 
52 Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence (n 10). 
53 Simpson, War (n 10). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Kurki, Causation in International Relations (n 41) 74. 
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assessing why an applicant left her country (namely, the well-founded fear of being 
persecuted), introduced a distinction between subjective and objective account. The 
language in this provision is overwhelmingly about ‘compelling reasons’, ‘motives’. 
The objective situation in the country of origin is helpful in order to assess the 
applicant’s credibility. In recent years, the use of Country of Origin Information has 
gained considerable value in this assessment process. Whether we use the word 
‘cause’ or ‘reason’, the point is that we do use causal language; we explore causation. 
What made this person leave? What was the cause of her doing that? It was a 
combination of x, y, z, including the human instinct for survival. In sum, whether we 
are talking about reasons, motives or intentions, these are all causes and the 
exploration of these causes requires clearer understanding. 
 
3.2 Refugee law cases 
 
The position of the UK courts regarding the causation test in refugee law cases is well 
established and rests on a rejection of the ‘but for’ test, favouring instead the 
‘effective reason’ test. This position was summarized by the House of Lords in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v K and Fornah as follows: 
 
The ground on which the claimant relies need not be the only or even the 
primary reason for the apprehended persecution. It is enough that the ground 
relied on is an effective reason. The persecutory treatment need not be 
motivated by enmity, malignity or animus on the part of the persecutor, whose 
professed or apparent motives may or may not be the real reason for the 
persecution. What matters is the real reason. In deciding whether the causal link 
is established, a simple "but for" test of causation is inappropriate: the 
Convention calls for a more sophisticated approach, appropriate to the context 
and taking account of all the facts and circumstances relevant to the particular 
case.56  
 
Lord Bingham further stated: ‘Whatever the difficulty of applying it in a particular 
case, I do not think that the test of causation is problematical in principle’.57 
 
3.3 Cases on subsidiary protection 
 
There is now a growing case law on subsidiary protection (Article 15c in particular) 
and the most important of these cases are discussed below. 
 
The UKCA did not discuss specifically the issue of nexus or causation in QD and AH 
v SSHD (Iraq).58 However, it made a number of interesting observations when 
considering the risk of a threat in Article 15c. For example, the UKCA explained: ‘it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K and Fornah [2006] UKHL 46, para  17 (Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill) referring to precedents such as R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 
and Islam v SSHD [1999] 2 A.C. 653-655; R (Sivakumar) v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2003] UKHL 14, [2003] 1 WLR 840, paras 41-42; Sepet v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2003] UKHL 15, [2003] 1 WLR 856, paras 21-23; and Suarez v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department [2002] EWCA Civ 722, [2002] 1 WLR 2663, para 29, as well as the 
Michigan Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, published following a colloquium in March 
2001.  
57 Secretary of State for the Home Department v K and Fornah (n 56) para 18. 
58 [2009] EWCA Civ 620. 
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is not thinkable that the Directive seeks to cover such remote and not truly dangerous 
situations [such as the possibility that a quiescent militia will re-emerge, or a rumour 
that the local wells have been poisoned] rather than the real risks and real threats 
presented by the kinds of endemic act of indiscriminate violence’.59 Thus fear alone is 
not sufficient; there must also be a possibility that that fear may become a reality.60 
The CA appears to give priority to the quantifiable, the measurable, the predictable, 
the probable. The CA further explained: ‘In this regard it is possible that the Directive 
is less strong than IHL, which … prohibits “threats of violence the primary purpose of 
which it to spread terror among the civilian population”’.61  The CA nevertheless 
rejected the requirement of a ‘consistent pattern’ in the context of Article 15c – 
requirement that had been adopted by the then Asylum and Immigration Tribunal in 
AA (Zimbabwe) - because ‘[t]he risk of random injury or death which indiscriminate 
violence carries is the converse of consistency’.62  
 
In contrast with the UKCA, the UKUT has explicitly considered (in much detail) 
causation in Article 15c. In GS (Article 15(c): indiscriminate violence) Afghanistan,63 
the UT confirmed that ‘by reasons of’ in Article 15c should be given the same 
meaning as ‘for reasons of’ in Article 1(A)2 of the Refugee Convention, which 
simply required ‘a connection’.64 When considering criminal activities, the UT saw 
‘no reason in principle why criminal acts should not be included in the scope of 
indiscriminate violence and, indeed, it is often difficult to separate armed conflict 
from a criminal act’.65 The UT further explained: 
 
The correct approach is not simply to ask whether the indiscriminate violence is 
criminal, or in pursuance of the armed conflict.  It is a question of causation.  
The words used in Article 15(c) are “by reason of indiscriminate violence in 
situations of international or internal armed conflict”.  There therefore needs to 
be a causal link between the threat to life or person and the indiscriminate 
violence, but that indiscriminate violence does not need to be caused by one or 
more armed factions or the state. 66  
 
The UT then went on to apply the ‘effective cause’ test (previously applied in AM and 
AM) according to which ‘the indiscriminate violence … does not need to be the only 
cause [of the threat] but [it] has to be more closely connected than only remotely’.67 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 Ibid, para 27. 
60 Ibid, para 28. Article 2(f) 2011 QD. The old Article 2(e) requires that ‘substantial grounds … for 
believing … a real risk of … serious harm’. 
61 Ibid, para 28. 
62 Ibid, para 32. 
63 CG [2009] UKAIT 00044. 
64 Ibid, para 35. See also, AM and AM (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, CG 
[2008] UKAIT 00091; Mark Symes argued that this interpretation was called for on the ground that 
considerations of IHL have been ruled out (by the ECJ in Elgafaji).  
65 CG [2009] UKAIT 00044, para 65.  The Tribunal confirmed its interpretation in HH and others 
(Somalia) that indiscriminate violence does not have to be violence that emanates directly from 
combatants themselves but instead from ‘looters and other criminal elements, taking advantage of a 
breakdown in law and order to go on the rampage’ (GS (Afghanistan) CG [2009] UKAIT 00044, para 
63).  
66 CG [2009] UKAIT 00044, para 65. 
67 Ibid, para 66. 
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The UT further considered whether violence under Article 15c could only be direct, 
or whether it could also include indirect violence (e.g., starvation, denial of medical 
care), and saw this to be also a question of causation. In this case (GS Afghanistan), 
the Tribunal said: 
 
One consequence of the years of conflict is that agriculture, and food 
distribution, have suffered and that has given rise to difficulties of food supply. 
In our judgment it cannot be said that such a general situation has come about 
“by reason of indiscriminate violence in situations of international or internal 
armed conflict”68 (italics added). 
 
The Tribunal explained: 
 
The food supply difficulties arise from a situation that has gone on for many 
years, and have not been shown to be the result of indiscriminate violence, as 
opposed to the targeted violence of armed groups against one another.69  
 
The Tribunal essentially was not convinced that even without an armed conflict, the 
situation in Afghanistan would be a great deal better, and so it concluded: 
 
The food supply problem cannot be shown to be connected otherwise than very 
remotely to indiscriminate violence, even if it is more closely connected to 
armed conflict.70  
 
In principle, therefore, the UT recognizes both direct violence, such as criminal 
activities (efficient cause), and indirect violence, such as food supply and lack of 
medical care (constitutive cause), to involve questions of causation. However, by 
choosing to apply the ‘effective cause’ test, in the sense of ‘more closely connected 
than only remotely’71, the Tribunal ended up denying any relevance in fact to 
constitutive causes.72 
Finally, in HM1 (Iraq), the UKUT adopted an ‘inclusive approach’73 to indiscriminate 
violence in Article 15c, ‘subject only to there being a sufficient causal nexus’.74 It 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Ibid, para 69. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Not in the sense of ‘the only and sole cause’ as described in Foster – see discussion in Section 1 
above. 
72 It may be noted here that in T v Immigration Officer [1996] UKHL 8 – a case concerned with the 
interpretation of ‘serious non-political crime’ in Article 1F(b) of the Refugee Convention – Lord 
Mustill noted the difficulties associated with applying ‘remoteness’ in practice ‘if the logic is not clear’ 
in the ‘continuous causal chain’: ‘I can see that even where the actor has no motive other than to 
further his cause, the chain of events between the act and the achievement of the political goal may be 
so long that the two are disconnected ... In short, to say that the political aim must cause the crime, or 
that the crime must not be too remote from the aim, does no more than assert that the crime must be 
really political in nature to fall within the exception’. He further warned against ‘criteria such as 
remoteness, causation, atrociousness and proportionality being too subjective to found the consistency 
of decision’, finding instead the objective application and definition of key terms in international 
instruments more useful. 
73 ‘[T]hat takes into account all the different types of violence in Iraq’. HM and Others v SSHD (HM1) 
(Article 15c) Iraq CG [2010] UKUT 331 (IAC), para 246. 
74 Ibid, para 239. Note that this approach was confirmed in HM2 (Article 15c) Iraq [2012] UKUT 
00409 (IAC), para 45. 
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referred to the ‘operative cause’ test: ‘the serious and individual threat involved does 
not have to be a direct effect of the indiscriminate violence; it is sufficient if the latter 
is an operative cause … that is not too remote’.75 The UT explained: 
 
In our judgment the nexus between the generalized armed conflict and the 
indiscriminate violence posing a real risk to life and person is met when the 
intensity of the conflict involves means of combat (whether permissible under 
the laws of war or not) that seriously endanger non-combatants as well as result 
in such a general breakdown of law and order as to permit anarchy and 
criminality occasioning the serious harm referred to in the Directive. Such 
violence is indiscriminate in effect even if not necessarily in aim.76 
 
When assessing the foreseeability of the risk of harm, a clear prediction is not 
required; rather the scale of the harm caused to civilians needs to be ‘substantial’ 
because of the intensity of the conflict existing at the relevant time.77 The UT 
acknowledged 
 
the difficulty in obtaining reliable data on civilian casualties whilst the conflict 
is in progress and the risks in excluding indirect casualties who are “killed or 
suffer serious illness as a consequence of the effects of war, for example, from 
imprisonment, abuse, starvation, or even the destruction of critical infrastructure 
and services”.78 
 
The UT therefore accepted factoring in considerations of State failure (as well as 
population displacement) into the overall assessment provided ‘a sufficient causal 
nexus’ (not necessarily an exclusive one) exists between the violence arising in the 
conflict and the harm.79 In the application of this test, the UT recognized the need for 
caution in drawing too many conclusions from patterns of violence. However, and 
somewhat contradicting itself, it held: 
 
We do think that it can properly be said that in August/early September 2010 
the various insurgent groups, AQI included, are weaker organizationally and 
militarily and that the evidence does not suggest that this will change in the 
foreseeable future. To that extent we do think it is correct to regard the levels of 
indiscriminate violence as being not only lower presently but likely not to revert 
to anything like the levels they reached in 2006/2007 (my italics).80 
 
In conclusion, the UT found the level of violence in Iraq not to be particularly high 
against civilians, except perhaps those with specific characteristics (e.g., government 
officials, security personnel, civil servants, journalists, medical doctors, etc).81  
 
4. Conclusion - Understanding causes of armed violence and the role of IHL 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75 HM and Others (n 73), paras.78-79. 
76 Ibid, para 80. 
77 Ibid, para 82. 
78 Ibid, para 91, citing Lambert and Farrell, ‘The Changing Character of Armed Conflict’ (n 39). 
79 Ibid, para 92. 
80 Ibid, para 260. 
81 Ibid, para 278. 
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Most if not all of the case law relating to people fleeing armed conflict today is about 
mixed motives or complex causes. With an increase in civil conflict,82 trying to 
understand causes has become immensely complicated. In its 2009 report on Iraq, 
UNHCR observed: 
 
Due to the complex situation of a high number of actors involved in providing 
security and actors involved in violence, where the lines are blurred, an asylum-
seeker’s failure to identify the perpetrator of violence should not be considered 
as detrimental to his/her credibility.83 […] Likewise, the complexity of a 
situation should not prejudice the substance of a person’s asylum claim.84  
 
Asylum courts are finding conventional causal analysis challenging in cases involving 
people fleeing the indiscriminate effect of generalized violence in a situation of armed 
conflict. This is because causation has so far mainly been understood in terms of 
‘efficient cause.’ This approach encourages definitional fixing of concepts, such as, 
conflict and threat, and direct causal explanation involving observables variables and 
outcomes. As discussed in this chapter clear examples of this approach can be found 
in the application of the ‘effective sole cause’ test, the ‘but for’ test and the 
‘predominant case’ test applied by many courts around the world.  
 
Less clear-cut however is the application of the ‘contributing cause’ test. This test 
discloses a certain receptiveness towards the wider social context of civilian flight – 
what this chapter has identified as ‘constitutive causation.’ However, it still leaves 
open the risk that courts may place too much faith in the possibility of isolating and 
weighing causes and thereby slip into efficient causal analysis. Illustrations of this can 
be found in the case law of the UKUT in cases such as GS and HM1 (confirmed in 
HM2) discussed above.85  In both cases, the UKUT recognized in principle the 
relevance of the wider material conditions causing civilian flight (including, lack of 
food supply and medical care) but in practice, by requiring that these constitutive 
causes be ‘more closely connected than only remotely’, it effectively engaged in the 
isolation and weighing of direct and indirect causes against each other. Based on the 
facts available to it in these cases, the Tribunal denied the relevance of these so-called 
‘remote causes’. 
 
This chapter argues for an approach to causation that recognizes and gives equal 
consideration to ‘constitutive causation’, not just in principle but also in fact. This 
necessitates a better understanding of how threats are constituted, both in terms of the 
underlying material conditions and also within a particular social environment. This 
broader approach discourages the early definitional fixing of ‘conflict and threat’ - or 
‘cause and effect’, by opening up instead enquiry into the complex character of 
violence in contemporary NIACs, and the experience and perceptions of asylum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Farrell and Schmidt, ‘The Causes, Character and Conduct of Armed Conflict’ (n 39). 
83 UNHCR’s Submissions in the Court of Appeal C5/2008/1706 on appeal from the AIT QD (Iraq) v 
SSHD, para 45.7 quoting UNHCR Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection 
Needs of Iraqi Asylum-Seekers, April 2009, 23-4, para 27. 
84 Ibid, para 45.7. 
85 Note that the UKUT uses a variety of formulations to describe the ‘contributing cause’ test: the 
‘connection cause’ test, ‘the ‘effective cause’ test and the ‘operative cause’ test, all it would appear to 
mean the same, and leading to unnecessary confusion. 
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applicants fleeing armed conflict. I end this chapter by questioning whether there is a 
role for IHL in such enquiry.  
 
Given the current state of IHL, it is hard to see what its role might be. Several courts 
are currently reaching out to IHL as a resource to assist in defining concepts, such as, 
armed conflict, including the intensity of the violence involved, whether explicitly or 
implicitly.86 For instance, the ECtHR in Sufi and Elmi v UK and the UKUT in AMM, 
both implicitly reached out to IHL in their understanding of causation by relying on 
the following indicative factors for assessing the intensity of violence which are 
provided in IHL: duration of confrontations, the extent of material destruction, and 
the number of civilians fleeing combat zones. However, the application of IHL in 
asylum law cases is controversial, not in the least because IHL and refugee 
law/subsidiary protection law have very different purposes.87  
 
More importantly, I am not convinced that IHL is currently equipped to play any 
significant role in our understanding of constitutive causation, unless it is able to 
develop and strengthen its normative framework to address the challenges of local 
conflict dynamics in NIACs. For instance, the appearance of a hierarchy in a party to 
an armed conflict  may disguise a much more complex situation involving local 
conflict dynamics. Thus, the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan appears to be both a 
hierarchically organized armed force and, at the same time, composed of many 
parochially focused local armed groups that often act against one another.88 
 
Finally, despite a relatively clear definition of armed conflict based around 
organisation and violence, IHL treaty-law is silent on who makes such a 
determination. At present, there is not one competent entity and it is left up to the 
belligerents (States or others) to make such crucial determination. On occasion, the 
belligerents' decision to qualify (or not) a certain situation as an armed conflict can 
come under judicial scrutiny.89 If not the belligerents themselves, the ICRC often also 
determines the existence of an armed conflict and classifies it (as either an IAC or a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86 Lambert, ‘The Next Frontier’ (n 39), case law in the UK, Germany, France, the Czech Republic and 
the Netherlands. However, the CJEU recently confirmed its ruling in Elgafaji. In the Case C-285/12 
Diakite, the Court concluded that on a proper interpretation of Article 15c, an internal armed conflict 
exists ‘if a State’s armed forces confront one or more armed groups or if two or more armed groups 
confront each other. It is not necessary for that conflict to be categorised as ‘armed conflict not of an 
international character’ under international humanitarian law; nor is it necessary to carry out, in 
addition to an appraisal of the level of violence present in the territory concerned, a separate 
assessment of the intensity of the armed confrontations, the level of organisation of the armed forces 
involved or the duration of the conflict’ (para.35). 
87 Storey, ‘The “War-Flaw”’ (n 39), and Durieux, ‘A Reply to Hugo Storey’ (n 39). 
88 T. Farrell and A. Giustozzi, ‘The Taliban at war: inside the Helmand insurgency, 2004-2012’ (2013) 
89 International Affairs 845.  
89 See, for example, ICTY, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Decision on the Defence Motion for 
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, IT-94-1-A (2 October 1995); International Criminal Court, 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the confirmation of charges (29 January 2007), No. 
ICC-01/04-01/06; Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) Judgment of 19 December 2005 [2005] ICJ Rep. See also M. 
Roscini, ‘The United Nations Security Council and the Enforcement of International Humanitarian 
Law’ (2010) 43 Israel L Rev 330. 
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NIAC), but such determination is not binding and it is often not even made public, for 
risk of undermining ICRC’s humanitarian access to the victims of the conflict.90 
 
In sum, I would continue to agree with the general view that when it comes to refugee 
or subsidiary protection, IHL may not be the best tool for assessing protection needs; 
international refugee law and international human rights law (including EU law on 
subsidiary protection) are best fit for the task.91 However, on the key issue of 
causation, there is still much work to be done. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90  ICRC’s interview with Kathleen Lawand, ‘Internal conflicts or other situations of violence – what is 
the difference for victims?’ (10 December 2012) 
<http://www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/interview/2012> accessed 8 January 2013. 
91 QD and AH (Iraq) (n 36) paras 15-18. See also, UNHCR’s Submissions in the Court of Appeal 
C5/2008/1706 (n 83) Annexe, paras18-21. 
